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One of the fundamental objectives of democracyis to ensure that public policy responds tocitizens’ needs. A large literature has demon-
strated, however, that there exist significant differences in
civic engagement across politically relevant, sociodemo-
graphic divides: Low income earners, the less educated,
the less urban, the young, and those belonging to ethnic
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[Correction added on July 11, 2016, after first online publication: Table 5 (Overview of Compulsory Voting in Switzerland) has been
updated, in section II additional information has been added about the selection of the control group, and in Table 12 additional results
were added showing the main estimates are robust to different definitions of the control group.]
1The positive empirical relationship between income and the propensity to vote in industrialized countries has been well documented
(DeNardo 1980; Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1993; Mueller and Stratmann 2003; Nevitte et al. 2009; Sigelman et al. 1985; Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995), although recent work finds that the positive correlation between income and vote choice is weaker in richer states (Brooks
and Brady 1999; Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su 2010; Gelman et al. 2007). This finding is consistent with Kasara and Suryanarayan (2015),
who show that high earners are more likely to vote when their own preferences differ strongly from those of low-income individuals.
Anderson and Beramendi’s (2012) study of the relationship between inequality and turnout further underscores the importance of income
for our understanding of variation in turnout.
minorities have a significantly lower propensity to vote
(Armingeon and Scha¨del 2015; Kasara and Suryanarayan
2015; Mueller and Stratmann 2003; Nevitte et al. 2009;
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).1 From this perspec-
tive, low turnout may reduce or even destroy the positive
welfare effects of government responsiveness through
electoral accountability (Bjo¨rkman and Svensson 2009;
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Stro¨mberg 2004), a phenomenon that Lijphart (1997)
has called the “democratic dilemma.” To the extent
that public policy systematically benefits voters over
nonvoters, those who abstain may “become locked
into a self-fulfilling cycle of quiescence, alienation and
government neglect” (Hill 2006, 216).
To preserve the welfare-enhancing effect of electoral
accountability, Lijphart (1997) and others (Dahl 1989;
Hill 2006) have pointed out that compulsory voting may
reduce representational inequality by mobilizing those
citizens who would otherwise remain politically inactive.
This incentivizes policy makers to enact policies that bet-
ter serve the needs of those who had previously been un-
derrepresented. Others, however, worry that compulsory
voting reduces the quality of electoral choice and creates
inefficiencies because sociodemographic turnout differ-
ences may simply reflect differences in affectedness or
information (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1999; Saunders
2011). For example, compulsory voting could increase
the share of less informed voters, which may reduce the
quality of electoral choice. Moreover, to the extent that
compulsory voting remains inconsequential for electoral
outcomes, low turnout would actually be preferable from
an efficiency perspective.
So far, there exists overwhelming evidence that
turnout in elections tends to be higher in countries that
practice compulsory voting (Jackman 2001; Mueller and
Stratmann 2003) and that turnout affects the distribu-
tion of votes across parties and candidates (Brunell and
DiNardo 2004; Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Hans-
ford and Gomez 2010; Kohler and Rose 2010). Some
have found that turnout tends to benefit the Democrats
in the United States (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003;
Erikson 1995) and the Labor Party in Australia (Fowler
2013). Others document that the Republican Party real-
izes higher vote shares in high-turnout elections (Nagel
and McNulty 1996; Tucker, Vedlitz, and DeNardo 1986).
This previous work has provided insights into the effects
of turnout on elections in which parties and candidates
offer entire packages ofmultidimensional policy bundles.
So far, however, we lack knowledge about how turnout
affects direct-democratic policy decisions.
We explore the public policy effects of turnout by ex-
amining how sanctioned compulsory voting affects refer-
endum outcomes. We argue that imposing a fine for ab-
stention increases turnout among those at the bottom of
the income distribution. This is because amonetary sanc-
tion imposes the highest relative costs on those who have
the least financial resources available, and, as is well doc-
umented in the literature, low-income individuals gen-
erally have a low probability of participating in elections
under voluntary voting (Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1991;
Husted and Kenny 1997). Thus, the set of citizens who
can bemobilized by electoral institutions such as compul-
sory voting is particularly large. Since low-income voters
favor more redistribution than high-income individuals
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Lipset 1959; Meltzer and
Richard 1981), differential mobilization should result in
more electoral support for leftist policies, that is, poli-
cies that aim to lower income inequality, increase welfare
spending, enhance workers’ employment conditions, and
strengthen pension systems (Kenworthy and Pontusson
2005; Mahler 2008; Mueller and Stratmann 2003).
Our evidence is based on an analysis of direct legis-
lation in Switzerland and consists of two parts. The first
andmajor part is a causal evaluation of the effects of sanc-
tioned compulsory voting in the Swiss canton Vaud. This
analysis enables us to estimate the causal effect of com-
pulsory voting on leftist policy support in referendums.
The second component of our empirical evidence is a cor-
relational study of the relationship between compulsory
voting and support for leftist policy proposals in referen-
dums in all Swiss cantons from1908 to 1970,which allows
us to explore the generalizability of our main findings.
We first estimate the effects of a sanctioned compul-
sory voting law in the Swiss canton Vaud that aimed to
mobilize citizens to participate in direct legislation. Vaud
practiced compulsory voting for more than 20 years
(1925–48). Abstention triggered a fine that local police
authorities collected by visiting nonvoters’ homes in
person. Such a focus on federal referendum outcomes in
one out of many cantons in a multilevel system provides
us with a design in which it is plausible to assume
that federal referendum issues are exogenous to policy
preferences within this single subnational jurisdiction
(Bechtel 2012). This circumvents some of the method-
ological issues that arise when examining national
election outcomes where parties’ and candidates’ policy
positions tend to form endogenously.Moreover, studying
this period promises insights into the role of electoral
institutions and political participation for the evolution
of the welfare state: In many of the federal referendums,
citizens voted on the fundamental components of the
modern welfare state, such as income taxation, the health
system, the right to work, pension schemes, and job
security regulations (Emmenegger 2009; Linder 1994).
The results of our study of federal referendum out-
comes inVaud suggest that sanctioned compulsory voting
has amassive effect on turnout, increasingparticipation in
direct legislation by almost 30 percentage points, which
implies that turnout was close to universal. Moreover,
we find that this massive turnout differentially strength-
ens electoral support for leftist policy positions by about
80% over the baseline level. These results remain ro-
bust when using different model specifications, applying
permutation tests, and employing multi-way clustered
754 MICHAEL M. BECHTEL, DOMINIK HANGARTNER, AND LUKAS SCHMID
standard errors. Based on our findings, we also report
point predictions for important welfare and social policy
proposals of the left. The results suggest that compul-
sory voting also had a considerable impact on support for
specific referendums on important redistributive policy
issues. We then explore the external validity of our main
findings by analyzing referendums in all Swiss cantons
from 1908 to 1970. These correlational results suggest
that our estimates generalize to other cantons and time
periods.
These findings speak to several literatures that have
explored the policy impact of political participation and,
more generally, the effects of electoral institutionsonpub-
lic policy. First, most scholars agree that knowledge about
the political consequences of virtually universal turnout is
crucial to our evaluation of the potential biases in public
policy due to unequal political participation. Yet previ-
ous work has either examined the impact of relatively
moderate increases in turnout (Filer, Kenny, and Mor-
ton 1993; Hansford and Gomez 2010; Knack 1994) or
relied on stated preferences of nonvoters in surveys to
explore this issue (Selb and Lachat 2009). Although these
studies have generated important insights, their ability
to explore the actual policy effects of compulsory voting
remains limited. Already Lijphart (1997, 4) points out
that “nonvoters who are asked their opinions on policy
and partisan preferences in surveys are typically citizens
who have not given these questions much thought, who
have not been politically mobilized, and who, in terms of
social class, have not developed class consciousness. It is
highly likely that, if theyweremobilized tovote, their votes
would be quite different from their responses in opinion
polls.” Finally, our results also add to an ongoing debate
about how compulsory voting may or may not affect po-
litical stability (Jackman 2001; Lijphart 1997) and inform
the literature on the consequences of electoral institu-
tions for the rise of the political left (Boix 1999; Rokkan
1970) and the evolution of the modern welfare state
(Husted and Kenny 1997; Radcliff 1992). We elaborate
on the implications of our findings in more detail in the
conclusion.
Compulsory Voting, Differential
Mobilization, and Public Policy
PreviousWork
Several scholars have argued that high levels of turnout
are desirable because they increase the legitimacy and the
stability of the political system (Dahl 1989; Lijphart 1997;
Saunders 2011). This debate has stimulated a large em-
pirical literature that has examined the effects of compul-
sory voting onpolitical participation andpolitical interest
along with the social, economic, and political determi-
nants of turnout.Most studies have focused on estimating
the mobilization effects of compulsory voting (Jackman
2001; Panagopoulos 2011). Countries that practice com-
pulsory voting experience turnout levels that are 7 to 15
percentage points higher on average than in countries
where voting is voluntary (Jackman 1987; Mueller and
Stratmann 2003). Recent estimates based on subnational
evidence in combinationwith causal inference techniques
suggest that these contemporaneous mobilization effects
may be even larger (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid
2015).
Scholarship has also examined the effects of com-
pulsory voting and turnout on elections by examining
changes in parties’ or candidates’ vote shares. While ear-
lier studies report somewhat mixed results (Nagel and
McNulty 1996; Tucker, Vedlitz, and DeNardo 1986), the
most recent set of studies documents that high turnout
improves the representation of Latinos and Asian Ameri-
cans in U.S. city elections (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005),
increases vote shares of mainstream parties (Ferwerda
2014), and raises electoral support for the Democrats in
theUnited States (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003;Hans-
ford and Gomez 2010). In the study that is most closely
related to our own contribution, Fowler (2013) shows
that higher turnout due to compulsory voting increases
vote shares for the Labor Party in Australian state assem-
bly elections. This previous work suggests that turnout
matters for the outcomes of elections in which parties
and candidates compete for office. We advance the liter-
ature by studying the effects of compulsory voting on the
outcomes of referendums in which citizens directly vote
on policy issues.
Mobilization, Sanctioned Compulsory
Voting, and Public Policy
How do increases in political participation affect pol-
icy choices in referendums? We answer this question by
focusing on compulsory voting as a legal intervention
that aims to increase political participation by (exoge-
nously) changing the costs of voting. Other examples
could be the introduction of postal voting, the removal
of poll taxes, weather events, changes in the accessibility
of polling stations, or the introduction of literacy tests.
These instruments and their introduction are typically in-
dependent of the dominant policy issues in pre-election
periods, the specific content of referendums, the quality
of the candidates who run for office, parties’ campaign
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strategies, or targeted campaign messages by political
interest groups. Increases in the costs of voting will
demobilize citizens to participate in elections, whereas
increases in the costs of abstaining will mobilize indi-
viduals (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). But if all citizens
equally respond to the cost changes, their interests would
still be equally well (or poorly) represented. Thus, accord-
ing to the equal mobilization argument, changes in the
costs of voting or nonvoting will remain inconsequential
for public policy.2
Our theory starts from the assumption that citizens
have heterogeneous propensities to vote. Any theoreti-
cal prediction about the effects of changes in the costs
of nonvoting on turnout depends on how these individ-
ual propensities respond to cost shocks. In principle, it
might be possible that individuals respond uniformly to
changes in the costs of nonvoting. This would result in an
equal mobilization of different voter groups. The avail-
able empirical evidence, however, suggests that citizens do
not respond uniformly to changes in voting costs. Rather,
the turnout effects of mobilization instruments appear to
depend on their specific nature (Jackman 2001). For ex-
ample, literacy tests impose particularly high costs on less
educated citizens. As a consequence, such tests depress
turnout among those with low levels of education (Filer,
Kenny, and Morton 1993).
We focus on two specific arguments about the effects
of mobilization efforts on public policy: the amplifying
bias argument and the bias correction argument. Both the-
ories reject the view that shocks to the costs of voting have
equal mobilization effects, albeit in opposite directions.
The amplifying bias argument predicts that nonparti-
san mobilization efforts such as simple get-out-the-vote
campaigns or norm-based approaches such as compul-
sory voting will increase representational inequality be-
cause they are most effective among those who already
have a high propensity to vote.3 Therefore, increases in
turnout will translate intomore representational inequal-
ity, which will amplify biases in public policy. Recent field
experimental evidence supports this idea: Enos, Fowler,
and Vavreck (2014) show that get-out-the-vote interven-
tions more strongly mobilize those who already have a
2A related argument holds that citizens who would abstain under
voluntary voting would vote randomly under compulsory voting,
which would, in expectation, lead to the same prediction.
3Note that this prediction differs from what we would expect from
electoral mobilization by interest groups. For example, recent work
argues that unions foster solidarity among their members and
thereby strengthen redistributive policy preferences (Mosimann
andPontusson2015). If unionsmobilize theirmembers, this should
reduce representational imbalances given that supporters of the
right generally have a higher probability to participate in elections
(Korpi 2006).
high propensity to vote, which would further increase
the potential biases in policy decisions due to unequal
political participation. Since constituencies that support
right-wingpolicies have ahigherpropensity to vote (Enos,
Fowler, and Vavreck 2014), this reasoning suggests that
compulsory voting will strengthen electoral support for
right-wing policies more strongly than support for leftist
policies.
In contrast, we argue that increasing civic en-
gagement can decrease representational inequality and
thereby reduce policy biases. This bias correction argu-
ment holds that introducing fines for nonvoting places a
disproportionate burden on those with low incomes, who
have been documented to have a particularly low prob-
ability of turning out (Fowler 2013; Mueller and Strat-
mann 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Such a
reasoning is consistent with the finding that poll taxes,
which impose higher relative costs on low earners, indeed
reduce turnout more strongly in poorer counties (Filer,
Kenny, andMorton 1991). Since a monetary punishment
for nonvoting will more strongly mobilize low-income
individuals, this will add voters located at the lower end
of the income distribution to the electorate. Following
Meltzer and Richard (1981), this changes the median
voter’s preferred level of redistribution: Themedian voter
under sanctioned compulsory voting will demand more
redistribution than the median voter under voluntary
voting. Thus, compulsory voting will increase demand
for redistributive policy instruments such as social wel-
fare, pension systems, and universal health care.4 There-
fore, the bias correction argument predicts an increase in
turnout among low-income voters that translates into a
shift toward more support for leftist, redistributive poli-
cies (Husted and Kenny 1997).
We examine the empirical validity of our argument
by studying the policy impact of sanctioned compulsory
voting in Switzerland in the first half of the 20th century.
Switzerland has a direct-democratic system where citi-
zens directly vote on policy issues in referendums. This
allows us to estimate how turnout changes due to com-
pulsory voting affect direct-democratic policy choices.
Therefore, our study promises to provide evidence that
enables us to arbitrate between different theoretical ac-
counts of the effects of turnout on policy decisions in
referendums.
4A related literature has examined the correlation between income
and voting behavior in elections where citizens vote for parties or
candidates. These studies find that the positive correlation between
income and vote choice is weaker in richer states (Brooks and Brady
1999; Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su 2010; Gelman et al. 2007) and
less industrialized countries (Nevitte et al. 2009).
756 MICHAEL M. BECHTEL, DOMINIK HANGARTNER, AND LUKAS SCHMID
The Swiss Party System
and Compulsory Voting in Vaud
in the Early 20th Century
Switzerland offers a useful political system for studying
the policy effects of compulsory voting in referendums.
Already Lijphart (1997) emphasizes its exception-
ally low levels of turnout, and Linder (1994, 95–96)
observes that “especially when participation is low,
the choir of Swiss direct democracy sings in upper or
middle-class tones.” Moreover, the period we study
(1908–70) includes the advent of industrialization in
the early 20th century that marked the rise of the classic
left-right conflict between capital and labor interests in
Switzerland, and this cleavage continued to dominate
political competition for decades (Fueter 1928; Kreis
2014). The increasing importance of the industrial sector
and the economic consequences of World War I further
strengthened the support of the working class for the
Social Democratic Party (SP). Catering to their low-
income constituencies, the SP demanded leftist policies,
such as social benefits, a tax-funded pension system,
public health care, and other types of redistributive
policies (Linder 1994). In contrast, the Free Democratic
Party (FDP) wanted to prevent state interventions in the
economy and opposed welfare programs. Since the FDP
held the majority of seats in the federal parliament, the
SP could influence public policy only through direct-
democratic decision making. As a consequence, citizens
had to vote on important welfare and social policy
proposals in federal referendums. Prominent examples
include proposals to introduce a public pension system
and a public disability insurance (1925, 1947), a popular
initiative to fight the economic crisis (1935), and a popu-
lar initiative for economic reforms and the establishment
of a right to work (1947). Within less than three decades,
direct legislation on economic and social policy formed
the basis of the modern welfare state in Switzerland.
To provide a causal estimate of how turnout affects
public policy, we first analyze the effects of sanctioned
compulsory voting that the canton of Vaud introduced in
November 1924. According to Vaud’s compulsory voting
law, all citizens between 20 and 65 years had to participate
in federal referendums. To assess whether the introduc-
tion of compulsory voting constitutes an exogenous inter-
vention, we searched the cantonal archives and carefully
reviewed a large set of primary documents, including par-
liamentary minutes and newspapers. These sources sug-
gest that policy makers in Vaud tried to increase political
participation and interest in political matters and to en-
sure that outcomes of federal referendums in Vaud had a
stronger impact on federal legislative decisions (Bulletin
du Grand Conseil 1924, 658).
We also analyzed the parliamentary minutes to ex-
plore whether policy makers introduced compulsory vot-
ing strategically. In particular, one may worry that the SP
advocated compulsory voting because it expected to ben-
efit from higher support for leftist policy positions. The
archival material, however, does not support this hypoth-
esis. First, the parliamentary minutes suggest that policy
makers lacked evidence on the effects of sanctioned com-
pulsory voting. They explicitly viewed the introduction
of compulsory voting for federal referendums as an ex-
periment to learn about its impact on civic engagement
(Bulletin du Grand Conseil 1924, 705–7). Second, the SP
did not hold a majority of seats in Vaud’s parliament,
which means that it was unable to introduce compul-
sory voting on its own. Third, the SP actually opposed
sanctioned compulsory voting because of the fear that
this may exacerbate Switzerland’s internal division be-
tween French- and German-speaking regions (Bulletin
du Grand Conseil 1924, 710–11). Fourth, it expected
that the enforcement of sanctioned compulsory voting
would cause overly high administrative costs and confu-
sion among voters about which types of referendums and
elections would be compulsory and which would remain
voluntary (Bulletin du Grand Conseil 1924, 703–5). Fi-
nally, the SP was concerned that the considerable fine for
nonvoting would infuriate their voter base, which con-
sisted mainly of low-income individuals.
At the end of the parliamentary debate, the FDP,
which wanted to increase the weight of the French-
speaking cantons in federal direct legislation to prevent
further centralization decisions that would have strength-
ened the federal state, supported the introduction of com-
pulsory voting, whereas the SP opposed it. Since the FDP
held the majority of seats (54%) in Vaud’s cantonal par-
liament, it introduced compulsory voting as part of a
revision of the law on political rights #113/49 on Novem-
ber 17, 1924. In sum, it appears implausible to assume
that the SP strategically introduced compulsory voting
because it expected to benefit from it. This lends plausi-
bility to the idea of compulsory voting as an exogenous
policy intervention.5
Vaud’s compulsory voting law sanctioned nonvot-
ers by imposing a fine of two Swiss francs (Gazette de
Lausanne 1924). This amount appears substantial, as it
equaled about 125%of a low-skilledworker’s hourlywage
5In addition, we note that for a clean identification of the average
treatment effect on the treated in a difference-in-differences design,
only the timing of the introduction of compulsory voting, not the
policy per se, has to be exogenous to canton-year (or district-
referendum) specific shocks (Abadie 2005, 2–3).
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(Siegenthaler and Ritzmann 1996). Local police authori-
ties collected the fine by visiting nonvoters’ homes in per-
son. The revenues from the fine, which varied from 8,000
to 16,000 Swiss francs per referendum, helped finance a
charity fund for poor people and public hospitals.6 Vaud
temporarily suspended its compulsory voting law in the
WorldWar II period from 1940 to 1945 and reactivated it
in late 1945 (Gazette de Lausanne 1945). AlthoughVaud’s
government continued to generally support compulsory
voting, it was eventually abolished in 1948 because of its
high administrative costs.
Data andMethod
Dependent Variables
For the treated and control districts, we collected data on
Turnout in all conflictual federal referendums (21) held
from 1908 to 1948 together with information about the
outcomes of these direct-democratic decisions.We define
a referendum as conflictual if the two major parties, the
FDP and the SP, offered diverging endorsements (e.g.,
if the FDP recommended voting in favor of a proposal
while the SP recommended voting against it). Table 6 in
the supporting information provides a list of all referen-
dums included in our sample together with information
about turnout and yes/no vote shares. Examining these
referendum results provides us with a direct measure of
support for a specific policy issue. In contrast, the use
of a party’s vote share would not allow us to disentangle
whether changes in electoral support are trulydue to com-
pulsory voting or merely the result of parties strategically
adjusting their policy platforms and pools of candidates
in response to the newly mobilized voters. By examining
votes on specific policy issues, we circumvent this hin-
drance to providing a causal estimate of the public policy
effects of compulsory voting.
To explore the effects of compulsory voting on sup-
port for leftist/rightist policies, we need measures of elec-
toral support for policy proposals endorsed by the left.
We create the variable Support Left, which measures the
share of votes for a proposal if it is endorsed by the Social
Democratic Party and the share of votes against a pro-
posal if the SP recommends voting against the proposal.
In the robustness section, we explore the sensitivity of
our results to an alternative, manual coding of proposals
that does not rely on parties’ endorsements. The results
6The supporting information provides the exact text of the com-
pulsory voting law (see Table 11 in the supporting information).
remain very similar.7 More formally, we define Support
Left as
Support Left :=
{
#Yes
#EV if SP = 1
#No
#EV if SP = 0,
(1)
where #Yes and #No is the number of yes and no votes,
respectively, and #EV denotes the number of eligible vot-
ers. The proposal-specific indicator variable SP equals 1
if the proposal was endorsed by the SP and is 0 if the SP
opposed the proposal.
Analogously, we create the variable Support Right to
measure support for rightist policy proposals, defined as
Support Right :=
{
#Yes
#EV if FDP = 1
#No
#EV if FDP = 0,
(2)
where #Yes and #No is the number of yes and no votes,
respectively, and #EV denotes the number of eligible vot-
ers. The proposal-specific indicator variable FDP equals
1 if the proposal was endorsed by the FDP and is 0 if the
FDP opposed the proposal.8
Finally, to allow for a direct statistical test of the rela-
tive effect of changes in turnout on electoral support, we
construct the variable Relative Support Left. This variable
measures the share of yes votes as a share of the total
number of valid votes if the SP endorses the proposal and
the share of no votes as a share of the total number of
valid votes if the SP opposes the proposal. Thus, this vari-
able directlymeasures relative electoral support for policy
positions of the left. Formally, the variable is defined as
Relative Support Left :=
{
#Yes
#Yes+#No if SP = 1
#No
#Yes+#No if SP = 0.
(3)
We collect a large set of covariates that previous work has
shown to help predict turnout and election outcomes.
These data include the number of ballots in a referen-
dum, public spending and revenues, percentage of sec-
ondary students, share of urban population, and share of
7For each referendum, Table 6 in the supporting information also
provides information about whether the SP endorsed it.
8Note that some proposals were neither supported nor opposed by
the SP, the FDP, or both. In these cases, parties declared a free vote.
While we would have liked to also identify those federal proposals
that were endorsed by the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP),
this is not possible because this party was not founded until 1918.
Moreover, for the post-1918 period, we find that in more than
80% of the proposals, both the FDP and the SVP held the same
policy positions. We also examined the consistency of FDP and SP
endorsements at the national and cantonal level. Using data from
1970, we find that these differences are negligible. For the SP, 97.4%
of the endorsements by this party at the national level coincided
with those by the SP in Vaud. This figure is only slightly lower
(91.1%) for the FDP.
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people older than 50 or 60, respectively. Since economic
indicators are only available since 1998, we use the num-
ber of motor vehicles per person as a proxy for economic
performance (Duch and Stevenson 2010; Filer, Kenny,
and Morton 1993; Knack 1995). Table 4 in the support-
ing information provides a complete covariate list and
data sources.
Research Design
We estimate the causal effect of compulsory voting on
turnout and support for leftist/rightist policy propos-
als in federal referendums. Ideally, we would compare
district-level outcomes of federal referendums under vol-
untary voting with referendum outcomes in the same
districts under compulsory voting. However, we never
observe both outcomes for the same districts. Therefore,
we need to impute a credible counterfactual that serves
as the baseline when estimating a causal effect. A simple
before-and-after comparison of treated districts will fall
short of providing convincing causal estimates, as many
time-varying factors may be responsible for differences
in the outcome variables over time. For example, citizens
voted on very different policy proposals in these periods,
which would already undermine the credibility of such a
before-and-after comparison.
To estimate the causal effect of compulsory voting
on support for leftist policy, we employ standard fixed
effects regression. The idea is to impute the missing
counterfactual—that is, the change in electoral support
for a specific policy proposal we would expect in the
treated districts in the absence of compulsory voting—
using the change in electoral support for the same policy
proposals in comparable control districts that did not
practice compulsory voting. This design allows us to
identify the causal effect in the presence of unobservable
time-invariant or smoothly changing confounders. It re-
quires, however, that we exclude districts in which voting
was compulsory at some point in the period we study.
Figure 2 in the supporting information shows a map of
Switzerland in the early 20th century that identifies which
cantons are included in the analysis as control units.
We estimate the effect of compulsory voting onpolicy
support using fixed effects regressions, as this identifies
our quantity of interest solely on the basis of within-
district variation in treatment, turnout, and referendum
outcomes. The fixed effects estimator for panel data, a
generalization of the difference-in-difference design to
multiple time periods, provides us with a valid causal es-
timate under the parallel trends assumption, as stated
in Equation (5) in Section I in the supporting infor-
mation (Angrist and Pischke 2008). The parallel trends
assumption says that in the absence of compulsory voting,
the dependent variable (e.g., turnout) would have ex-
perienced the same changes over time as in the con-
trol districts in which voting remained voluntary during
the treatment period. Further below we show that the
parallel trends assumption is plausible in our applica-
tion. Therefore, this identification strategy prevents un-
observed, time-invariant district characteristics, such as
a district’s geographic features, its local political culture,
or its demographic, economic, and social composition,
from confounding our causal effect (see Section I in the
supporting information for a detailed, formal treatment
of our research design). Furthermore, including district-
specific time trends helps to account for local trends
in unobserved confounders, such as changes in voter
preferences.
Several features of our research design suggest the
use of two-way clustered standard errors to avoid falsely
rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect (Bertrand, Du-
flo, and Mullainathan 2004). More specifically, since we
observe the same districts over time and all districts vote
on the same referendum on the same day, we have to
account for intradistrict and contemporaneous depen-
dence. Although this does not affect the estimated treat-
ment effect, which will remain unbiased, throughout all
estimations we compute standard errors that use the two-
way variance estimator proposed by Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2011), which provides us with standard er-
rors that are robust against both potential district-level
and referendum-level dependencies. We also address the
fact that our treatment is imposed at the cantonal level,
as this means that the treated districts within a canton
are not independent in case of a common cantonal-level
shock. Although, again, this does not affect the magni-
tude of the estimated treatment effect, this may result in
deflated standard errors. To address this issue, we com-
pute the p-values using the two-way clustered standard
errors in combination with a t-distribution with only 10
degrees of freedom. This reflects that, although we have
12 cantons in our sample, the interventionwas imposed at
the cantonal level, and, additionally, one of our covariates
(share of automobiles) is measured at the cantonal level.
Results
Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Support
for Leftist Policy in Referendums
Model 1 in Table 1 presents fixed effects regression esti-
mates of the impact of compulsory voting on turnout for
federal referendums. We focus on referendums in which
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TABLE 1 The Policy Effects of Compulsory Voting
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Turnout Support Left Support Right Rel. Support Left
Mean in treated VD 0.83 0.35 0.48 0.42
Compulsory voting 0.33 0.23 0.10 0.19
(6.44) (3.56) (1.68) (2.30)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.12] [0.04]
Observations 2,163 2,163 2,163 2,163
Districts 103 103 103 103
District FEs
√ √ √ √
Referendum Day FEs
√ √ √ √
District time trends
√ √ √ √
Covariates
√ √ √ √
Effect size (% ) 66% 192% 26% 83%
Notes: This table shows the coefficients from fixed effect regressionswith t-statistics in parentheses andp-values in brackets. All specifications
include district and referendum day fixed effects, as well as linear district-specific time trends and the full set of covariates. Standard errors
(not shown) are two-way clustered by district and referendum days. The p-values are based on the t-distribution with 10 (number of
cantons in the sample minus 2) degrees of freedom to take into account that compulsory voting was imposed at the cantonal level and one
of the covariates (share of automobiles) is measured at the cantonal level. Effect size is the percent increase in the outcome variable for the
treated districts relative to the counterfactual outcome level in the absence of the treatment. Compulsory voting was enforced from 1925 to
1939 and from 1946 to 1948. It was suspended from 1940 to 1945. Covariates: share of Catholic population, share employed in the primary
sector, share employed in the secondary sector, share of self-employed individuals in the primary sector, share of self-employed individuals
in the secondary sector, share of self-employed individuals in the tertiary sector, and share of automobiles. All models are weighted relative
to the number of registered voters per district.
the two major parties offered conflictual endorsements;
that is, one of the parties recommended voting for a pol-
icy, whereas the other party advocated voting against the
proposal.9 All models include district and referendum
fixed effects. We also include district-specific linear time
trends to account for smooth, time-varying trends at the
district level and a full set of sociodemographic and eco-
nomic covariates.10 All estimations use two-way robust
standard errors that are clustered by district and referen-
dumday (Cameron,Gelbach, andMiller 2011).Addition-
ally, for our treatment estimate, we report p-values that
are based on the t-distribution with 10 degrees of free-
dom to account for the fact that the treatment is applied
at the cantonal level. We report various robustness as well
as placebo tests further below. According to Model 1 in
Table 1, turnout for referendums increases significantly
(p < .01), by 33 percentage points on average in the
period in which Vaud practiced compulsory voting. To
9This choice implies that referendums in the period in which
compulsory voting was temporarily suspended are no longer in
the sample because there are no conflictual referendums in that
period.
10The covariates are share of Catholic population, share employed
in the primary sector, share employed in the secondary sector,
share of self-employed individuals in the primary sector, share of
self-employed individuals in the secondary sector, share of self-
employed individuals in the tertiary sector, and share of automo-
biles.
better grasp the magnitude of this effect, we divide the
point estimate by the counterfactual turnout level in the
absence of compulsory voting. We find that compulsory
voting boosts turnout by 66% on average.
How does this pronounced increase in political par-
ticipation affect support for leftist and rightist policy in
referendums? Model 2 reports our results for the vari-
able Support Left. This dependent variable measures the
share of votes for proposals endorsed by the SP and the
share of votes against a proposal if the SP recommended
voting against the policy (see Equation 1). Put simply,
this captures support for the position advocated by the
left party. We again include our compulsory voting treat-
ment indicator along with a full set of sociodemographic
and economic covariates, district fixed effects, referen-
dum fixed effects, and district-specific linear time trends.
The results suggest that electoral support for leftist policy
positions increases significantly, by 23 percentage points
in the period in which Vaud sanctioned nonvoters. This
represents a significant (p = .01) increase of more than
190% over the baseline level of support for leftist policy
positions in the absence of compulsory voting.
According to the equal mobilization argument, com-
pulsory voting should also have mobilized support for
rightist policies. To evaluate this prediction, we estimate
the effect of compulsory voting on the variable Support
Right. This variable measures the share of votes for pro-
posals that the FDP endorsed and the share of votes
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against a proposal if the SP recommended voting against
the policy (see Equation 2). Model 3 in Table 1 reports
the results. The coefficient on our treatment indicator is
positive (.10) but only half the size of the effect we find
for leftist policy. Moreover, the effect on Support Right is
not significant if we use the p-values for a t-distribution
with 10 degrees of freedom (p = .12).
These results suggest that leftist policy positions
gained more electoral support due to compulsory vot-
ing. Yet we still lack a direct test of the relative effect of
compulsory voting on referendums. To implement such
a test and directly estimate the differential mobilization
effect of compulsory voting, we regress the variable Rela-
tive Support Left on the treatment indicator. This variable
measures the relative strength of support for leftist policy
proposals. If a proposal was endorsed by the SP, the vari-
able equals the number of yes votes as a share of the total
number of valid votes for the proposal. In case a proposal
was opposed by the SP, the variable equals the share of no
votes as a share of the total number of valid votes.
Model 4 in Table 1 reports our estimate. We find that
compulsory voting significantly (p = .04) increases rela-
tive support for leftist policy positions, by 19 percentage
points on average. Compared to the counterfactual level
of Relative Support Left, this constitutes an increase by
80%. Thus, the turnout increase due to compulsory vot-
ing strongly boosts electoral support for leftist policies
even when taking into account that it may also have some
mobilization effects on voters of the right.
Whatmechanismunderlies thisdifferentialmobiliza-
tion effect? We theorize that parties engage in an efficient
allocation of their scarce campaign resources and invest
most strongly inmobilization efforts in the context of ref-
erendums on core issues as opposed to votes on periph-
eral issues. An efficiency-based allocation of campaign
resources has direct consequences for a party’s mobiliza-
tion efforts and the potential effect of compulsory voting.
Parties will mobilizemore strongly and successfully when
citizens can vote on core issues as compared to peripheral
issues that have a lower priority on their policy agenda.
This reasoning implies that, although compulsory voting
generally increases support for leftist policies, it will most
strongly mobilize voters in referendums on noncore is-
sues because parties spend their resources onmaximizing
support for core issues. Thus, the effect of compulsory
voting on turnout and support for leftist policies should
be greater when the referendum is on peripheral issues
than when voters decide on core issues where parties have
already heavily mobilized.
To evaluate this prediction, we performed a qualita-
tive coding of all referendums to identify those proposals
that concerned core issues of the left. These are deci-
sions on unemployment benefits, pensions, the size of
government, social welfare, labor rights, the minimum
wage, and immigration.We use this information to parti-
tion the data and reestimate themainmodels on these two
subsamples. Table 2 reports the results. First, we note that
the effect of compulsory voting on turnout is significant
and sizable for both core and noncore issues. However,
we find that for noncore issues, the effect of compulsory
voting on turnout is greater (41 percentage points) than
for core issues (26 percentage points), although the mean
turnout in Vaud under compulsory voting is quite simi-
lar (85% and 82%). This suggests that compulsory voting
has the strongest effect on turnout when parties tend to
mobilize less and is consistent with the idea of parties en-
gaging in an efficient allocation of their scarce campaign
resources. Consequently, when parties’ campaign efforts
succeed in realizing almost the full potential of electoral
support for a policy, compulsory voting itself has less
pronounced effects.
The remaining results in Table 2 underscore this im-
pression. The effect of compulsory voting is considerably
stronger for referendums on noncore issues. When con-
sidering Support Left (Model 3), the treatment effect for
peripheral issues is estimated at 41 percentage points,
whereas the effect for core issues (Model 4) is consider-
ably smaller (15 percentage points). We also reestimate
the main model for Relative Support Left (Models 7 and
8). Although compulsory voting still increases electoral
support for leftist policies, this differential mobilization
effect is more pronounced when examining referendums
on policy proposals that do not represent core issues of
the left (the estimated treatment effect is 37 percentage
points for noncore issues and 11 percentage points for
core issues of the left). Taken together, our results suggest
that, although compulsory voting affects electoral sup-
port significantly for both peripheral and core issues, the
effect materializes most strongly in referendums on less
ideologically defining issues.
These estimates provide information about average
treatment effects. But what did the effects of compulsory
voting look like in specific and politically important
referendums? To illustrate the impact of the surge in
turnout, we compute its effects on three policy proposals
particularly relevant from the perspective of the left-right
welfare state cleavage.The first referendumis the so-called
“crisis initiative” in 1935, a popular initiative to fight the
economic crisis. The initiative stipulated a large set of
leftist policy reforms, including a state guarantee for a
minimumwage, subsidies to workers and farmers, higher
unemployment benefits, stricter regulation of financial
markets, restrictions on capital outflows, and stricter
antitrust regulation. Based on our estimates, compulsory
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TABLE 2 The Policy Effects of Compulsory Voting on Core Issues of the Left
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model
Outcome Turnout Support Left Support Right Rel. Support Left
Core issue left No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean in treated VD 0.85 0.82 0.43 0.29 0.42 0.53 0.50 0.36
Compulsory voting 0.41 0.26 0.41 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.37 0.11
(3.55) (7.02) (3.09) (3.79) (0.01) (1.89) (2.63) (1.79)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.99] [0.09] [0.03] [0.10]
Observations 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545
Districts 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
District FEs
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Referendum Day FEs
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
District time trends
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Covariates
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Effect size (% ) 93% 46% 2050% 107% 0% 23% 285% 44%
Notes: This table shows the coefficients from fixed effect regressions with t-statistics in parentheses and p-values in brackets. The outcome
of Models 1 and 2 is turnout, of Models 3 and 4 support left, of Models 5 and 6 support right, and of Models 7 and 8 relative support
left. All specifications include district and referendum day fixed effects as well as district-specific time trends. Standard errors (not shown)
are two-way clustered by district and referendum days. The p-values are based on the t-distribution with 10 (number of cantons in the
sample minus 1) degrees of freedom to take into account that compulsory voting was imposed at the cantonal level. Effect size is the
percent increase in the outcome variable for the treated districts relative to the counterfactual outcome level in the absence of the treatment.
Compulsory voting was enforced from 1925 to 1939 and from 1946 to 1948. It was suspended from 1940 to 1945. A proposal is coded as a
core issue if it involves a decision on unemployment benefits, pensions, size of government, social welfare, labor rights, minimum wage,
or immigration. Covariates: share of Catholic population, share employed in the primary sector, share employed in the secondary sector,
share of self-employed individuals in the primary sector, share of self-employed individuals in the secondary sector, share of self-employed
individuals in the tertiary sector, and share of automobiles. All models are weighted relative to the number of registered voters per district.
voting increased support for the crisis initiative in Vaud
by 22percentage points as compared to the counterfactual
level of support in the absence of compulsory voting. As
another example, consider the popular initiative to intro-
duce the right to work in 1947. According to our findings,
electoral support for this policy was 30 percentage points
higher in Vaud than it would have been without com-
pulsory voting. Clearly, political power also implies the
ability to prevent policy changes advocated by political
opponents. Therefore, as a final example, we have com-
puted the effect of compulsory votingonelectoral support
for a federal bill that would have reduced public officials’
salaries in the context of the economic crisis in 1933. The
SP opposed this bill, and we find that compulsory voting
reduced support for this proposal by 15 percentage points
due to the mobilization effect of compulsory voting.
Identifying Assumption and Robustness
In this section, we first demonstrate the plausibility of the
main assumption needed for estimating the causal effect
of compulsory voting on turnout and public policy. We
then turn to probing the robustness of our results. We
relax some of the assumptions about the functional form
that underlies our estimates, perform permutation tests
to further explore the significance of our findings, and
reestimate the main results using an alternative, manual
coding of leftist policy proposals.
Parallel Trends Assumption. To assess the plausibility
of our identifying assumption, we consider the evolution
of all four of our outcome variables in treated and control
districts in the pretreatment period. This constitutes an
important step to assess whether the outcome variables in
treated and control districts followed parallel trends prior
to the introduction of compulsory voting. If this is the
case, it adds to the credibility of our results because it is
more plausible to assume that, in the absence of the intro-
duction of compulsory voting, our outcome variables in
treated and control districts would have followed parallel
trends. The upper left panel in Figure 1 plots average
turnout in conflictual referendums by treatment group.
In the period prior to compulsory voting, turnout trends
are almost perfectly similar in both treated and control
districts. This does not constitute a direct test of the par-
allel trends assumption, which remains fundamentally
untestable. Yet the parallelism of pretreatment trends
lends credibility to the assumption that in the absence of
compulsory voting, treated and control districts would
have followed the same turnout trajectory. As soon as
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FIGURE 1 Pretreatment Trends in Turnout and Support for Leftist/Rightist Policy Positions in
Federal Referendums
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Note: The figure shows pretreatment trends (period averages) for our four outcome variables (Turnout, Support Left, Support Right, and
Relative Support Left) in Vaud and the control districts (in %). DiD = difference-in-differences. The pretreatment period ends in 1924.
Vaud introduced compulsory voting in 1925.
Vaud introduces compulsory voting, however, the two
time series strongly diverge. Thus, the turnout effect we
document above is also clearly visible to the naked eye.
We also examine the pretreatment trends in support
for leftist and rightist policy proposals. The upper right
panel in Figure 1 shows the evolution of support for
proposals endorsed by the SP in treated and control
districts over time. In the pretreatment period, electoral
support for policies endorsed by the Social Democratic
Party evolve similarly in both treated and control
districts. But once compulsory voting is introduced,
support for leftist policy increases in treated districts
and remains virtually constant in the control district.
The lower left panel in Figure 1 shows the pretreatment
trends in support for proposals endorsed by the right.
Support for proposals endorsed by the FDP follow very
similar trends in treated and control districts prior to the
introduction of compulsory voting.
The lower right panel in Figure 1 plots relative
support for leftist policy proposals, our main outcome
variable. We again find that prior to the introduction of
compulsory voting, support for leftist policy relative to
right policy proposals trended downward in both groups,
and the change seems almost identical. Taken together,
these results strengthen our confidence in the identifying
assumption: It appears reasonable to assume that in the
absence of compulsory voting, our outcomes of interest
would have followed similar trends. Therefore, when
examining the effects in the treatment period, observable
changes in the dependent variables in the control districts
provide us with a credible counterfactual change in
turnout and policy support in the treated districts.
Functional-Form Assumptions. We conduct several
tests to explore the robustness of our results. First,
we reestimate all models and additionally include
district-specific quadratic time trends. This functional
form relaxes the assumptions needed for estimation since
it eliminates nonlinear local trends in unobserved covari-
ates, such as smooth changes in sociodemographics such
as economic growth or age structure. As a consequence,
this adds to our confidence that the estimated treatment
effect can be attributed to the introduction of compulsory
voting and not to some trend in unobserved covariates.
The results in Table 7 in the supporting information
are comparable to those reported in Table 1. Most
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importantly, we again find that compulsory voting differ-
entially mobilized support for leftist policy proposals: We
estimate that, on average, relative support for leftist policy
proposals in referendums significantly increased by 17
percentage points due to compulsory voting (p = .06).
Second, we reestimate the treatment effects within
a fully nonparametric setting by excluding all covariates
and time trends. Table 8 in the supporting information
shows the results.The treatment effects are slightly smaller
but exhibit the same pattern:We find a strong and signifi-
cant turnout increase (estimated at 25 percentage points)
under compulsory voting, and the effect on electoral sup-
port is again differential: Relative support for leftist policy
increases significantly (p = .04) by about 12 percentage
points during compulsory voting, and this effect still con-
stitutes a 40% increase over themean level of relative sup-
port for leftist policy proposals. Finally, we reestimate the
main results (Table 1) without weights, that is, assigning
equal weight to each district. Table 9 in the supporting
information reports the results. The estimates are very
similar and, if anything, slightly larger than those from
our main analysis.
Permutation Tests andAlternative Coding of Leftist Pol-
icy Proposals. We also conduct a series of permutation
tests by estimating placebo treatment effects for the con-
trol districts (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010).
This permutation test proceeds as follows: We define a
placebo treatment group that contains all districts in a
canton and pretend that these districts practiced com-
pulsory voting in placebo treatment periods defined as
1925–39 and 1946–48. Note that assigning all districts in
a canton to either the placebo treatment or the control
condition is important tomirror that the actual treatment
is applied at the cantonal level. Based on this assignment,
we generate additional temporal variation by including
four leads and four lags of the placebo treatment indica-
tors. This provides us with a total of nine placebo treat-
ment period indicators. For each of these indicators, we
estimate a regression identical to our main model with
district fixed effects, referendum fixed effects, district-
specific linear time trends, and all covariates to compute
the placebo treatment effect.We repeat this procedure for
all 11 control cantons and plot the distribution of these
99 placebo treatment effects. This provides us with the
distribution of the treatment effect under the null hy-
pothesis of no effect and does not rely on any assumption
about the correlation structure between the error terms.
The upper left panel in Figure 3 in the supporting
information plots the frequencies of placebo treatment
effects on turnout for the control districts. The mass of
the distribution is concentrated at 0 percentage points,
and the effects are roughly symmetrically distributed. The
red bar in Figure 3 indicates the actual treatment effect
for our treated districts estimated in the main analysis
(about 30 percentage points). We note that all placebo
effects are clearly located to the left of this effect. This
suggests that the turnout effect we document can be at-
tributed to the fact that Vaud introduced compulsory
voting. When computing the corresponding p-value, we
find that the turnout effect is highly significant (p =
.01). We repeat this permutation test for all remaining
outcome variables: Support Left (p = .01), Support Right
(p= .15), andRelative Support Left (p= .02). As predicted
by the bias correction argument, the results suggest that
the turnout increase induced by compulsory voting had a
significantly positive effect on support for policies advo-
cated by the left, both in absolute and relative terms. The
p-values derived from these permutation tests are very
similar and, if anything, even smaller compared to those
computed from the two-way clustered standard errors
reported above.
Our original coding used parties’ endorsements to
identify leftist policy proposals, and we focused on those
proposals for which we found partisan conflict in the
party endorsements. To explore the robustness of our re-
sults, we perform an alternative, manual left-right coding
of policy proposals. Table 6 in the supporting information
provides a list of all proposals together with information
about this alternative classification. Our alternative left-
right coding results in a smaller, more restrictive set of
referendums that we can analyze. Table 10 in the support-
ing information presents the results when we reestimate
our main models using our alternative left-right coding.
We again find that compulsory voting increases turnout
in these referendums by about 29 percentage points, and
this estimate is highly significant (p < 0.01). Most im-
portantly and consistentwith ourmain results,Model 4 in
Table 10 in the supporting information shows that com-
pulsory voting significantly increases relative support for
leftist policy proposals by 10 percentage points. Thus, our
findings remain intact when using an alternative coding
of leftist policy.
External Validity: Evidence from Swiss
Cantons, 1908–70
So far, we have examined the effect of compulsory voting
on public policy in one canton. This focus allowed
us to reduce threats to the internal validity of our
estimates that result from case heterogeneity and bias
induced by observable and unobservable confounders.
We deliberately prioritize internal validity over external
764 MICHAEL M. BECHTEL, DOMINIK HANGARTNER, AND LUKAS SCHMID
TABLE 3 Turnout and Support for Leftist Policy Proposals: All Cantons, 1908–70
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Turnout Support Left Support Right Rel. Support Left
Mean in treated VD 0.74 0.30 0.44 0.40
Compulsory voting 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04
(3.40) (3.89) (1.68) (2.08)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.12] [0.06]
Observations 6,255 6,255 6,255 6,255
Districts 172 172 172 172
District FEs
√ √ √ √
Referendum Day FEs
√ √ √ √
District linear time trends
√ √ √ √
Covariates
√ √ √ √
Effect size (% ) 16% 30% 7% 11%
Notes: This table shows the coefficients from fixed effect regressions with t-statistics in parentheses and p-values in brackets. The outcome
of Model 1 is turnout, of Model 2 support left, of Model 3 support right, and of Model 4 relative support left. All specifications include
district and referendum day fixed effects, as well as linear district-specific time trends and the full set of covariates. Standard errors (not
shown) are two-way clustered by district and referendum days. The p-values are based on the t-distribution with 10 (number of cantons
in the sample minus 2) degrees of freedom to take into account that compulsory voting was imposed at the cantonal level and one of the
covariates (share of automobiles) is measured at the cantonal level. Effect size is the percent increase in the outcome variable for the treated
districts relative to the counterfactual outcome level in the absence of the treatment. Compulsory voting was enforced from 1925 to 1939
and from 1946 to 1948. It was suspended from 1940 to 1945. Covariates: share of Catholic population, share employed in the primary sector,
share employed in the secondary sector, share of self-employed individuals in the primary sector, and share of self-employed individuals
in the secondary sector, and share of self-employed individuals in the tertiary sector. All models are weighted relative to the number of
registered voters per district.
validity since we want to avoid trying to generalize an
estimate that is internally invalid. However, after having
established a credible estimate of how compulsory voting
affects support for leftist policy, we now turn to the
question of whether our findings have the potential to
generalize to other time periods and cases.
We performed a detailed coding of the archival ma-
terial for all districts in all Swiss cantons from 1908 to
1970 and collected information about when exactly and
how the districts we excluded from our analysis practiced
compulsory voting along with the available covariate in-
formation. This data collection effort is time-consuming
and challenging because enforcement of compulsory vot-
ing sometimes happened at the municipality level, where
archival data are often missing. For some cases, there re-
mains some uncertainty about the extent to which com-
pulsory voting was actually enforced. Consequently, we
expect the effects to be smaller because of imperfect en-
forcement. Moreover, since we have only data since 1908
and most cantons had introduced compulsory voting
prior to that year, we point out that identification in the
subsequent analysis stems mainly from the abolishment
of compulsory voting.
According to Model 1 in Table 3, compulsory voting
again significantly and positively affects turnout in
direct legislation. On average, districts that practice
compulsory voting experience 10 percentage points
higher turnout in federal referendums. We also find a
positive and significant effect on support for leftist policy
positions: According to Model 2 in Table 3, yes votes for
leftist policy proposals increase by about 7 percentage
points in periods of compulsory voting. In contrast,
compulsory voting is not significantly associated with
changes in support for right policy positions (Model
3). Unsurprisingly, the results in Model 4 in Table 3
suggest that compulsory voting and relative support for
leftist policy are positively and significantly correlated.
Relative support for leftist policy positions increases by 4
percentage points during periods of compulsory voting,
which represents an 11% increase over the baseline.
These results based on a sample of all cantons from 1908
to 1970 suggest that our results have the potential to
generalize to other cantons and time periods.
Conclusion
Is there a policy bias due to unequal political partici-
pation? Can compulsory voting alleviate this bias? Al-
though this idea has attracted considerable attention in
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the literature and the potential gravity of the underly-
ing problem is well known, we possess little systematic
knowledge about the actual policy effects of compulsory
voting. We argue that sanctioned compulsory voting in-
creases support for leftist policies because it imposes the
highest costs on citizens at the bottom of the income dis-
tribution, who tend to hold leftist policy preferences. We
explore the empirical validity of this argument in the con-
text of a direct-democratic system where citizens directly
vote on policy issues in referendums. Our results sug-
gest that sanctioned compulsory voting increases turnout
in federal referendums massively, by about 30 percent-
age points on average. More importantly, we find that
this turnout increase has a pronounced positive effect on
support for leftist policy proposals: Electoral support for
policy proposals endorsed by the Social Democratic Party
doubles under compulsory voting. We also conduct a set
of simulations to explore the magnitude of these effects
in specific important referendums that lie at the heart
of the left-right cleavage. We find that compulsory vot-
ing induces profound shifts in votes for leftist policy and
stricter market regulation. This policy effect of compul-
sory voting is lower (but still significant) in referendums
on core issues, a finding that appears consistent with the
argument that parties concentrate campaign spending on
core issues, which limits the potential effect compulsory
voting can have on referendum outcomes and, in turn,
public policy choices.
These results add to several literatures that have ex-
amined the economic and social policy effects of elec-
toral institutions, and inform the debate about the im-
pact of electoral mobilization on political stability. First,
and most directly, our results suggest that exogenous in-
creases in turnout may indeed increase support for leftist
policy. Second, since we examine the effects of compul-
sory voting on support for leftist policy in the period of
industrialization and the Great Depression, one may hy-
pothesize that electoral institutions such as compulsory
voting have a role to play in our understanding of the
evolution of the modern welfare state that has not yet
been appreciated in the literature so far. Third, although
our analysis focuses on how turnout affects support for
specific policies, we expect the findings to also inform the
debate aboutwhether politicalmobilization leads tomore
erratic electoral outcomes and unstable political majori-
ties by increasing the share of uninformedvoterswho tend
to vote almost randomly. At least in the case we examine,
sanctioning nonvoting leads to a systematic increase in
electoral support for leftist policies, which appears diffi-
cult to square with the random voting argument.
We have studied the consequences of turnout in a
direct democracy with a focus on estimating an inter-
nally valid causal effect. Do our results have the poten-
tial to generalize to elections in representative (indirect)
democracies? First,wenote that the recent evidenceon the
positive effect of turnout on leftist parties’ vote shares in
elections is consistentwith our findings. Second, however,
we acknowledge that the extent to which our results gen-
eralize depends on various conditions, such as the impor-
tance of valence factors versus issue positions in electoral
choices. The generalizability of our results, of course, also
hinges on the baseline level of turnout in a political sys-
tem since low turnout under voluntary voting constitutes
a necessary condition for the pronounced effects we doc-
ument.However, participation rates have been decreasing
for decades in most industrialized democracies (Dalton
and Wattenberg 2000) and remain far from universal. In
the United States, for example, average turnout in presi-
dential elections has remained below 60% since the late
1960s, and in many other countries, participation rates
in subnational and European Union elections are even
lower. Therefore, our results seem to provide informa-
tive evidence for ongoing debates about the desirability
of compulsory voting. Third, we have analyzed referen-
dum outcomes (i.e., behavioral data) to learn about the
policy effects of compulsory voting. Exploring the causal
mechanisms at the individual level would be a valuable
endeavor that we leave to subsequent research. Finally, we
have examined the effect of a plausibly exogenous change
in electoral institutions on policy choices in referendums.
Given the potentially profound policy consequences of
interventions such as compulsory voting, postal voting,
or enfranchisement decisions, future research may want
to devote more attention to identifying cases in which we
can learn about the effects of political participation on the
(strategic) adoption of these and other types of electoral
institutions (Drometer and Rincke 2014).
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